Protocol security is important. So are efficiency and cost. This paper provides an early framework for handling such aspects in a uniform way based on combinatorial optimisation techniques. The belief logic of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (BAN logic) is viewed as both a specification and proof system and as a 'protocol programming language'. The paper shows how simulated annealing and genetic algorithms can be used to generate correct and efficient BAN protocols. It also investigates the use of parsimonious and redundant representations.
Automated Support for Protocol Development
Providing convincing and practical support for secure co-operation between distributed parties is one of the major tasks facing the security community. Over a decade ago Burrows, Abadi and Needham recognised this and developed a belief logic (almost invariably called 'BAN Logic') that could be used to reason about the security of protocol abstractions [1] . The work created considerable debate and gave fresh impetus to protocol security research and to formal approaches in particular. These formal approaches can be seen as complementing the more heuristic techniques such as the Interrogator and the NRL Protocol Analyser [2] .
Various formalisms and tools have been brought to bear on the problem. Some researchers, for example, have encoded theories of protocol security in the logics of powerful theorem provers such as HOL [3] . Brackin has also developed BAN-like belief logic approaches to verification and has produced significant HOL-based support [4] [5] [6] ). Some have provided processalgebraic definitions of security and used modelchecking to demonstrate an implementation's conformance. Of particular note here is the flexible CSP framework described in [7] (which includes a chapter on the use theorem proving). There has been a great deal of research in the field.
It would seem that automated support in the area is largely limited to the analysis of existing protocols (or abstractions of them) with respect to a definition of security. There is virtually no work at all in automated secure refinement (i.e. design synthesis). The first results on metaheuristic search for protocols were presented in [8] . The only other work using search as a design technique is the model checking work of Song and Perrig [9, 10] . Furthermore, correctness is only one design goal. Designers often wish to find an efficient way of implementing a specification and they may also want to explore the consequences of making different initial assumptions or even requiring different goals. This paper describes a framework for automated protocol synthesis that seeks to handle issues such as correctness and various costs in a uniform way.
Protocols and Belief Logic Representations
We now introduce the notational conventions used in this paper and provide some background on security protocols and how they can be represented in a belief logic.
Notational Conventions
General Protocol Description. The parties that participate in security protocols are generally termed principals. A protocol run consists of a sequence of messages between principals and will be described using the standard notation. Keys and Encryption. All messages are encrypted using symmetric (conventional) key encryption, where both principals share the same key. Messages sent over a network unencrypted might simply be spoofed or altered by a malicious adversary. In practice unencrypted concrete messages may be sent to implement a protocol but these do not carry security significance. They will generally be messages to achieve synchronisation between principals, e.g. to cause secure encrypted components to be sent. We shall denote a symmetric key intended for communication between A and B by Kab etc. We shall denote the message X encrypted using key K by {X} K . A message may have several components, separated by commas. Thus
(1) A → B : {Y, Z} Kab denotes that in the first message of the protocol A sends to B the message with two components Y and Z encrypted using key Kab.
Nonces. Principals often generate and use elements to enable them to determine that messages they receive really have been created as part of the current run and are not replays of previously issued messages. These elements have values specific to the current run and are intended to be used only once. A stream of nonces could typically be obtained using a secure pseudo-random number generator. We shall denote a nonce generated by A by N a etc. If a principal generates a nonce for the current protocol run and receives messages that contain it, those messages are deemed to have been created after the nonce was generated.
Belief Logic Representations 2.2.1. Motivation and Basic Notation
We shall not concern ourselves with the concrete representations of protocol messages. We shall work with an abstract belief logic representation.
At the concrete level a protocol is a sequence of messages between principals. Initially the principals hold sets of data items. The protocol messages are used to communicate such data items. At the end of the protocol the principals should hold some identified sets of data. For example, in a key distribution protocol, we might want a particular key Kab, held initially by a key server S, to be held at the end by both A and B (and no-one else).
In belief logic representations, the initial data items, the message components and the eventual desired data state elements are replaced by assertions of belief. Rather than holding a key Kab the key server now holds the belief that the key Kab is good for communication between A and B. Similarly, a message does not contain the key Kab but the same belief about key goodness. Rather than A and B both holding the key at the end they are now expected to hold the belief in the goodness of key Kab. In some cases the relationship between beliefs held and corresponding concrete data is not so clear. For example, we might require that A believe that B believes that the key Kab is good for communication (second order belief). This may occur, for example, when A receives a message from B encrypted using the key Kab without there being any explicit data item to represent this.
Thus, we can use a belief logic to provide a semantics to an existing concrete protocol (a pro-cess known as idealisation). BAN logic provides a language for denoting belief assertions. These assertions are found as assumptions, statements made in messages and the final goals of the protocols. This has been the way BAN logic has been used so far, i.e. to prove properties of, or discover flaws in, existing protocols. We shall work directly with the abstract belief logic representations (with the eventual aim of refining to a concrete representation). We shall use only a subset of the full logic which we describe below.
Key Goodness. The assertion
means K is a good key for communication between P and Q. Implicit in this is that the key K has not been revealed to any principal other than P or Q (and possibly a highly trusted third party). 
Inference Rules
When a message is received by a principal who possesses the appropriate key to decrypt it, the logic provides inference rules that dictate what new beliefs he may infer from the message contents. The major inference rules are given below (with P and Q representing arbitrary principals and X an arbitrary assertion).
Message Meaning Rule If principal P sees ( ) a message encrypted under a key K it believes it shares only with principal Q, P may conclude that it was originally created by Q, who 'once said' its contents. In formal terms
Nonce Verification Rule If P believes that Q once said X and believes X to be recent (fresh), then P may conclude (believe) that Q currently believes X. In formal terms
Jurisdiction Rule If P believes that Q believes X and believes that Q is an authority on (has jurisdiction (|=>) over) the matter, then P should believe X too. In formal terms
These rules are well-motivated. The Message Meaning Rule captures the notion that only P and Q are able to create the encrypted message {X} K and so if P did not create it (it is implicit in the logic that P can recognise messages he has created himself) it must have been created by Q, and so he may deduce that Q once said its contents X.
The Nonce Verification Rule is a way of 'promoting' once said assertions to actual belief. Even if, P believes that Q once said X he cannot be sure Q believes X now. Q may have actually uttered a message yesterday (containing X) and a malicious observer may simply have recorded it and may now be replaying it today. Consider for example a message sent by Q containing the assertion (N q). Q may well have believed N q to be a fresh (never used before) nonce yesterday, but clearly would not make such an utterance today (because N q has been used already). On receiving a malicious replay of the message P would still legitimately conclude that Q once said (N a) but not that Q actually believes it. If however, there is something about the message that indicates it has been created very recently (typically a nonce connected to the current run of the protocol) then P may legitimately infer that Q actually believes it now.
The Jurisdiction Rule captures the notion that some principals are trusted to carry out certain tasks and make particular judgements. Suppose a principal A believes that a key server S believes that a particular key K is good. Key servers are highly trusted and developed to very rigorous standards. They might legitimately be trusted far more than normal principals. They should have 'jurisdiction' over statements about whether a key is good. If A believes S believes it is a good key then A should 'take S's word for it'.
We will need also some smaller rules such as the ability to deduce A |∼ N a from A |∼ (N a, N b) etc. but we shall omit these here.
An important feature of BAN logic is that principals are honest. They do not lie; the sender of a message communicates only sincere beliefs, i.e. ones that it holds at the time of message issue. These beliefs may have been held initially or else derived via BAN-inference rule applications when previous messages were received. Any series of honest exchanges between two principals defines a feasible (with respect to the logic) protocol. It is this set of feasible protocols that we consider as the design space. Figure 1 gives a set of initial assumptions and a feasible protocol. In this protocol fragment key server S believes that the key Kab is a good key for A and B to use. Both A and S believe that the key Kas is good for communication between them. A believes that S has jurisdiction over key Kab's goodness. A also believes that a particular number N a is a wellformed nonce and that it is actually fresh. Let us assume that the single goal of this protocol is for A to believe the key Kab is good for communicating with B (i.e. A |≡ A Kab ←→ B, and so the protocol is a fragment of some key distribution protocol.
Illustrative Example
A believes N a is well-formed and so may legitimately include it in message (1) to S. This is encrypted with a key A believes is good for communicating with S. When S receives (sees) this encrypted message, it can apply the key Kas to decrypt it and deduce (using the Message Meaning Rule) that A |∼ N a. There is nothing about the message that should convince S that the message is fresh. S may now reply with message (2) which contains two of its currently held beliefs (the first is an initial assumption, the second is the newly derived once 'said in the past' belief). Now when A receives message (2) 
General Protocols
Starting with a set of assumptions, a number of choices can be made for the direction and contents of the first message. Once the direction of a message is decided, the contents of each such message can be chosen. In the protocol above A could send any of 2 4 − 1 non-empty combinations of beliefs (however odd they may seem). Once the contents are chosen the message can then be 'sent' and the receiver's belief state updated accordingly. A protocol is a sequence of feasible choices about which messages to send at each stage. We generate lots of feasible protocols and 'execute' them to find out what they actually achieve. Indeed, we view BAN logic not only as a specification notation and proof system but also as a 'protocol programming language'. This view seems close to that of the original BAN logic's authors. They start with designed protocols and 'execute' them (i.e. make the appropriate BAN inferences) and check whether the protocols meet their goals. We start with arbitrary feasible protocols execute them and see what they achieve.
The abstract execution of any series of feasible exchanges defines a constructive proof that a protocol achieves what it does (since the execution requires actual updating of the belief states). What we wish to do is find protocols that achieve what they do but also achieve what we want. Thus, we wish to search the space of feasible protocols for ones satisfying a specification. We shall generate candidate protocols in a way that ensures they are feasible.
We have chosen a subset of the simplest variant of BAN logic (the original, as it happens) consistent with demonstrating the feasibility of our technique. There have been many extensions to the logic and we believe that these extensions could be incorporated in a system such as the one described below.
Solutions and Fitness

Solutions as Integer Sequences
We now show how sequences of non-negative integers can be interpreted as valid protocols. Each message has a sender, a receiver and a sequence of C belief components. C is chosen by the user. Consider an arbitrary sequence of C + 2 nonnegative integers vs, vr, vb 1 , . . . , vb c . Number the principals 0.. (N − 1) . vs mod N gives the sender, vr mod N gives the receiver. If the sender and receiver turn out to be the same then we take (vr + 1) mod N as the receiver. We interpret vb 1 , . . . , vb c as indices into the vector of beliefs currently held by the sender (i.e. held by the sender at the time the message is issued). Thus, if there are T beliefs currently held by the sender (indexed by 0..(T − 1)) then the index of the first belief component of the message to be sent is given by vb 1 mod T etc. In this way, arbitrary positive integers can be interpreted as validly held beliefs. In fact we allow only certain simple types of messages to be sent and so we actually deal with indices of sendable beliefs (see Section 3.2).
Initially each principal maintains an ordered sequence of beliefs X, Y, . . .. The first belief is a special "null belief" that we use to denote absence of a belief in a message component. When a principal derives a new belief Z, i.e. when it receives a message, this is added to the sequence at the tail. For the protocol given in Figure 1 the belief states of principal S, initially and after receiving the first message
Our implementation is in Java with principals' beliefs stored in vectors with index values starting at 0. Beliefs are indexed by their current position in the sequence. Thus, the null belief has index 0 for each principal.
After receiving the first message the contents of the second message 
Initial and Sendable Beliefs
Initial beliefs may involve 1, 2 or 3 operators from the set {|∼, |≡, |=>}. Let SIM P LE be the set of atomic assertions about nonces (e.g. N a), Then initial beliefs may take the following forms:
• P |≡ X, where P is a principal and X ∈ SIM P LE.
• P |≡ Q |=> X , where P and Q are principals and X ∈ SIM P LE.
where op ∈ {|≡, |∼ , |=>}, P , Q and R are principals and X ∈ SIM P LE.
We have not found the above unduly restrictive. We believe reasonable assumptions tend to be immediate to a principal or else about jurisdiction; examination of [1] seems to confirm this.
Sendable beliefs are assertions in SIMPLE, the null belief and assertions involving a single operator in the set {|≡, |∼, |=>} to be included in messages. Thus, N a, S |=> A Kab ←→ B are both sendable but A |∼ B |∼ N b is not. This is to simplify our initial investigation only.
Goals
Goals are read in from a file. They may have one, two or three operators from the set {|≡, | ∼ , |=>}. The first such operator must be |≡.
Interpreting a Solution
An integer sequence representation of M messages is decoded and executed as a protocol as follows.
• Install the initial belief states of the relevant principals (from file).
• For m = 1 to M (i.e. for each message do the following)
1. determine sender m and receiver m (as indicated in section 3.1). If they share a key for communication then proceed else ignore the rest of the message and go to 5.
2. decode each of the C beliefs corresponding to message m. Each belief is represented by an integer V say. If the sender currently holds T sendable (see Section 3.2) beliefs then this is interpreted as the jth = (V mod T + 1)th sendable belief.
3. Examine the set of received beliefs. Note whether any of the beliefs contains a component that the receiver believes to be fresh, e.g. if A receives a message containing the belief A |∼ N a and A believes that the nonce is fresh, (N a), then the whole message is regarded as fresh. Once a protocol has been executed in the above way and the intermediate results recorded a fitness can be calculated for the protocol as described below.
The Fitness Function
The fitness function for each putative protocol generated needs to guide the search to a solution. There must be some notion of goodness of a putative protocol reflecting how close it comes to satisfying the goals of the problem. We have used fitness functions for a protocol of the form:
The w i are weightings and g i is the number of goals achieved after message i (including goals achieved after previous messages). Since the nature of the fitness function influences the heuristic search we investigate a number of strategies Figure 2 . Weighting Strategies for setting the weights w i . These are detailed in Figure 2 and described below. We intend to investigate several other general forms of fitness function. The form shown is for illustrative purposes but the cumulative nature of the reward for satisfying a goal early has some interesting consequences. The weighting strategies are:
early credit (EC) The weights are monotonically decreasing with i. The notion is that satisfying goals early should be rewarded.
uniform credit (UC) All the weights are the same.
delayed gratification (DG) The weights are monotonically increasing. This captures the idea that early satisfaction of goals may not necessarily be a good thing.
advanced delayed gratification (ADG)
The weights are monotonically increasing and no credit is given immediately for satisfying goals in the initial exchanges.
uniform delayed gratification (UDG) No credit is given immediately for satisfying goals in the initial exchanges and later weights are equal and positive.
destination judgement(DJ) Only the final weight is non-zero. It doesn't matter how you satisfy goals, the important thing is how many you satisfy in the end.
We now investigate the results of applying each of the above strategies to generate protocols sat-isfying particular pre-and post-condition specifications.
Search Strategies
The model presented above does not dictate any particular search strategy. In the next section we apply simulated annealing to the same examples presented in [8] using genetic algorithms. In this paper we present the principal results using genetic algorithms for comparison. Below we provide brief outlines of simulated annealing and genetic algorithms.
Simulated Annealing
Simulated annealing [11] is a local search technique that allows escape from local optima. From the current state a move in a local neighbourhood is generated and considered. Improving moves are always accepted. Worsening moves may also be accepted probabilistically in a way that depends on the temperature T of the search. A number of moves are considered at each temperature. Initially the temperature is high and virtually any move is accepted. Gradually the temperature is cooled and it becomes ever harder to accept worsening moves. Eventually the process 'freezes' and only improving moves are accepted at all. If no move has been accepted for some time then the search halts. The technique has several principal parameters:
3. the number of moves N considered at each temperature cycle 4. the number F of consecutive failed temperature cycles (where no move is accepted) before the search aborts 5. the maximum number IC M ax of temperature cycles considered before the search aborts
The initial temperature T 0 is obtained by the technique itself. The other values are typically supplied by the user. In the work described here they remain fixed during a run. More advanced approaches allow these parameters to vary dynamically during the search. The algorithm is as follows:
1. Let T 0 be the start temperature. Let prot init be the initial protocol. Increase this temperature until the percentage of moves accepted within an inner loop of N trials exceeds some threshold (e.g. 60%).
2. Set iteration count IC=0, set frozen=false, let prot curr be the current protocol.
3. while(not frozen) repeat 3a-3d There are convergence results based on Markov chain analysis [12] . Guaranteed converge to the global optimum requires more function executions than exhaustive search. There are theoretical formulae to provide starting temperatures and cooling schedules. As Reeves [13] says the precise means of cooling is less important than the overall rate. Simple geometric cooling is adopted throughout. At each temperature it is recommended that the number of moves attempted be equal to the size of the neighbourhood. Our tools can also abort the search process when a solution has been found (though the result may not necessarily be the most efficient protocol possible).
Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithms (GAs) are heuristic search techniques based on natural selection. A population of candidate solutions is generated randomly and then successive generations are evolved using three evolutionary 'operators'. These are selection (survival according to fitness), crossover (where solutions 'mate', producing offspring) and mutation (where solutions may spontaneously change a characteristic). The general idea is that populations evolve according to rules that will in general support the emergence of ever fitter individuals (i.e. ones with higher evaluation value.) For an excellent introduction to genetic algorithms the reader is referred to the classic text by Goldberg [14] . Below we provide a simple example for illustration and indicate how the basic technique has been augmented.
A Simple Example
Suppose we wish to maximise the function f (x) = x over the range 0..7. First we generate randomly a population of candidate solutions expressed as bit strings, say (010, 001, 010, 000). These bits strings are often referred to as 'chromosomes'. We shall assume that the bit strings are a straightforward binary encoding of integers in the range. An obvious evaluation of the fitness of a solution x for this problem is simply the value f (x). Thus the fitness values for the initial population are (2, 1, 2, 0) . The total fitness of the population (i.e. the sum of the fitness values of all its members) is 5.
A new population of size 4 is now selected from the current population. When the selection is made for each of the four members of the new population, the first solution 010 of the current population has a 2/5 chance of being chosen, the solution 001 has a 1/5 chance, the second 010 has a 2/5 chance and the final solution 000 has no chance of being chosen. This is selection with replacement (and so it is possible, for example, that the same solution will be picked four times). Suppose this gives rise to the new population (010, 001, 010, 010). The actual fitness values are (2, 1, 2, 2) and the total fitness is now 7 (and we see how fitness-weighted selection -survival of the fittest -supports the evolution of healthier populations).
We now 'mate' successive pairs by swapping some randomly chosen subsequences of bits (usually termed crossover ). Suppose that the final bit is chosen for the first pair of solutions and the last two bits are chosen for the second pair. A population {011, 000, 010, 010} results. The fitness values for this population are (3, 0, 2, 2). The total fitness has not increased in this case but a particular solution has emerged that is fitter than any previous one (and so has better chances of further survival).
Selection according to fitness and mating are powerful mechanisms for obtaining populations of high performing solutions but will never produce the optimum (111) in this example. A final operator, mutation, now allows each bit to change value with some small probability, e.g. 0.01. Suppose that the only bit to flip at this stage is the first bit of the second string giving rise to {011, 100, 010, 010}. One can now see how further selection and mating can lead to eventual appearance of even better solutions (and 111 in particular). After mutation the solutions are then evaluated. The select-mate-mutate-evaluate cycle repeats until convergence has been achieved, until no further progress is apparent, some practical upper bound on the number of generations has been reached, or else one candidate solution 'solves' the problem at hand.
The technique is heuristic. Mating is not guaranteed to produce better solutions and mutation can at times be unhelpful. In addition, for nonlinear functions, convergence to a local optimum is possible (though the principal strength of genetic algorithms is their global optimisation ability over a great range of different problems).
Sophistications of the Methods
The above describes what is generally referred to as the standard simple genetic algorithm following Goldberg [14] . In practice certain sophistications are often made. One such improvement is the use of sigma scaling. Here the objective function value f x i is not used as the measure of fitness of the ith solution x i . Rather, a value is used given by f
where k is a constant (the value of 2 is used in the work pre-sented here). f and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the objective function values f x i and are defined by
where Size is the number of solutions in a population. A fitness value of 0 is associated with objective values f x i less than (f − k * σ). Thus, all fitness values will be non-negative (and this simplifies probabilistic selection according to fitness) and extremely unfit solutions have no chance of further selection.
A variety of selection methods are available. The one described in section 4.2.1 is known as roulette wheel selection. A more common means of selection in modern day genetic algorithm work is that of tournament selection. Here, two members are selected according to fitness as before and the fittest is then chosen to appear in the next generation. This technique can be extended to selection from tournament groups of size G > 2 but we will use only tournament pairs (i.e. G = 2).
Crossover (i.e. swapping subsequences of bits) is not forced to happen when a pair is selected. Rather, it takes place with some probability. In our experiments we will examine a range of values for this probability (and allow the bit mutation probabilities to vary too).
It has also been found that the insertion of 'noise' into the fitness function may improve the performance of the search. Our tools allow fitnesses of the form
i.e. where a random non-negative real number less than U pperBound is added (U here is a uniform random variable over the range [0,1]).
Protocol Encoding
For the protocol tools the integer sequences defining messages (see section 3.1 ) are encoded either as integer arrays (in simulated annealing) or else as bit substrings of chromosomes (for genetic algorithms). Four bits were used to encode senders and receivers and six bits were used to encode indices of beliefs. It was found to be beneficial to have all senders and receivers at the beginning of the chromosome. Thus, for a fivemessage protocol the first 5 × 4 × 2 = 40 bits represented the five senders and receivers of the messages. With four beliefs per message the remaining 5×4×6 = 120 bits represented the 20 belief components that make up the five messages. Other optimisation techniques can easily be incorporated in the framework we have created.
From Assumptions to Goals
This section reports the results of applying the technique described above to the derivation of a three-party key distribution protocol. A set of initial assumptions is given and the technique is applied to derive abstract protocols meeting the stated goals. The experiments reported below serve as proof of concept. At first we give a good number of goals, including some that might be regarded as of assistance to the technique (but we will remove these later). We also wish to show that the business of protocol synthesis is quite a subtle one and we demonstrate just how important is the choice of cost function.
The Assumptions
Three parties participate in this key distribution protocol A, B and S. A and B both share keys with the server S. They maintain their own nonces that they believe to be fresh. The assumptions are:
←→ B B |≡ S |=> A |∼ N a S |≡ A
Kas
←→ S S |≡ B
Kbs
←→ S S |≡ A
Kab
←→ B
The assumptions are straightforward except perhaps for the common belief by A and B that S tells the truth about the other's uttering of nonces. We deal with this is Section 5.5.
The Goals
The first set of goals requires that at the end of the protocol run A and B must each believe that it possesses a good key Kab for session communication, that the other has made a statement to this effect, and that each believes the other believes the key is good.
We shall limit the search to six messages. The reader can verify that establishing common (to A and B) first order belief in the key requires 4 messages. Furthermore, to establish the remaining four goals in the next two messages requires either A or B to be in possession of information about the other's nonce and this must have come via the server. This explains the inclusion as assumptions of B |≡ S |=> A |∼ N a and A |≡ S |=> B |∼ N b. The first, for example, allows B to receive a belief A |∼ N a from S that he himself should now believe and hence be able to use in a message to A. Similarly for B.
Experimental Method
We have applied both simulated annealing and genetic algorithms to this problem. In the descriptions of protocols that follow in the rest of this paper, belief components that do not actually contribute to the attainment of the overall protocol goals have been excised. Similarly, redundant beliefs have also been removed (i.e. when the same belief is included twice or more in a message). Only the core security relevant protocol is presented. Such 'junk beliefs' have been removed manually (though this could easily be automated). We return to the issue of superfluous beliefs later in the paper.
Simulated Annealing Results
For simulated annealing a temperature cooling factor of 0.95, a cutoff of 150 iterations, 400 candidate moves within each inner loop and a maximum without accept of 50 iterations were used. Twenty runs of the algorithm were carried out for each fitness function strategy. The results are presented in Figure 3 . Significantly destination judgement is the worst performing fitness function. Uniform credit performs reliably and efficiently. Since a run takes at most a few minutes, even a success rate of 0.55 is not a practical problem. Perhaps the most interesting thing to note about these results is the apparent practical robustness against choice of fitness function. This contrasts with the results from genetic algorithms which are presented below.
Genetic Algorithm Results
The technique was applied to the above problem with various combinations of weighting strategy, crossover and mutation probabilities. Crossover probabilities took values from the set 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, mutation probabilities took values from the set 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02, 0.025. Every combination of weighting strategy, crossover probability and mutation probability was tried (making 150 combinations). Each combination was tested by applying the algorithm 20 times to the problem and recording the results. A population size of 200 was used. This value is for illustrative purposes and no claim to optimality should be assumed.
The technique is not guaranteed to succeed and so we imposed an upper bound of 200 on the number of generations allowed before a run is terminated. This choice is motivated in part by the need to carry out very large numbers of runs (3000) to test the technique. A designer might require only a few runs. In practice a run will take only a few minutes (running on a 450MHz Rows are indexed by crossover probability, columns indexed by mutation probability.
Pentium PC). Figure 4 shows the fraction of successful runs of the technique at each combination of crossover and mutation probability. The results indicate that Early Credit clearly performs poorly and Uniform Credit seems the most robust. The number of protocol evaluations per success (i.e. finding a protocol meeting all goals) for Uniform Credit is given in Figure 5 .
The results seem plausible. We illustrate why using one of the protocols generated by the experiments and shown in Figure 6 . Under the Early Credit scheme if the first two exchanges are between A and S as shown then one of the goals is , and so incurs a reward. However, from this point onwards the choices are very restricted. To satisfy all the goals using only six messages the next two exchanges must be between B and S and similar to those shown. The third message must be from B to S and contain something B believes to be fresh. The fourth message must be from S to B and contain the response to the challenge in the third message and also provide the belief A Kab ←→ B. Two goals have now been established and A and B are now in a position to communicate. If the protocol is now to meet all its goals the next two exchanges must be between A and B and cause the remaining goals to be achieved. This will require at least one of the principals to hold a belief that contains an element believed by the other to be fresh. Thus, we see that the inclusion of A |∼ N a in the fourth message is essential. The fifth message must come from B and include A |∼ N a. It must also include the statement of goodness of the key A Kab ←→ B and supply a suitable challenge N b to A. The 6th message must therefore return the challenge and contain the belief A Kab ←→ B . The point to note here is that after the first two messages the die is largely cast and the search must find messages (3)-(6), or very similar ones, from the decision space -the possibilities are very few. Early Credit favours this sort of initial message sequence.
Consider now the protocol shown in Figure 7 , also found during experimentation. After two messages no goals have been met. However, the symmetry established allows numerous routes to success. For example, the roles of A and B can be swapped in (3)- (6), mutatis mutandis. Although Figure 7 may appear strange it should be remembered that this is an abstract description. Implementationally, the first message could actually be sent from A to B (together with some helfpful plaintext (invisible in BAN logic) saying who it was from, and B could then simply pass it on to S (together with the encrypted message (2) shown). Asymmetric protocols similar to the original one may be created, for example the one in Figure 8 .
Again the roles of A and B can also be swapped (mutatis mutandis). The greater design freedom is apparent and yet this freedom comes at the price of foregoing early rewards. Note that making some progress initially seems a good idea. For this problem it is essential that A |≡ A
Kab
←→ B
and B |≡ A Kab ←→ B be established first. A protocol that achieves these two goals in the first four messages is clearly better than one which achieves these only after six messages. The former may well be close to achieving all the goals, the latter certainly is not. This explains in part the poor performance of Destination Judgement which rewards these two protocols equally. Reward is based on achievement and not on potential (judgement of which requires insight).
The conclusion to be drawn is that the evaluation function matters. Designers will have to experiment with a number of different strategies or else a more sophisticated adaptive strategy will be needed (this is common in genetic algorithm frameworks). However, all the strategies achieved some success. For specifications with a greater range of possible protocols it would be interesting to note the differences in the protocols that emerge using different strategies. Investigation of the efficacy of various evaluation functions will form a major part of future research.
The genetic algorithm results indicate quite starkly the interaction between fitness function, crossover probabilities, mutation probabilities and success rate. For any fitness strategy it seems possible to derive GA parameter settings that give reasonable results but these settings need to be determined on a per fitness function basis. There is an interesting contrast with the simulated annealing results (which were pretty robust against choice of fitness function). In particular, Early Credit is highly reliable for SA but poor for GA. It is however, not very efficient even for SA. Destination Judgement is poor for both. However, when GAs work they would appear to do so efficiently (as shown in Figure 5 ). The message that caused the first goal to be met could cause the second to be met too if the search process were to augment the message with a suitable freshness indication. It is part way there already and rewarding this is likely to help the technique climb towards a solution. We now remove these two intermediate goals leaving the required set of goals as:
Reduced Goals
A |≡ A Kab ←→ B B |≡ A Kab ←→ B A |≡ B |≡ A Kab ←→ B B |≡ A |≡ A Kab ←→ B
Simulated Annealing Results
For simulated annealing, with parameters as before, 20 runs of the algorithm were carried out for each fitness function strategy. The results are presented in Figure 9 Again simulated annealing is robust to changes in 
Genetic Algorithm Results
For the same population size (200) and the Uniform Credit strategy this new problem was subjected to the technique (20 runs at each combination of crossover and mutation probabilities as before). The results are given in Figures 10 and 11 . As expected, the results degrade but a fair degree of success is still obtained. The intermediate goals present in the previous problem clearly helped. An interesting avenue to investigate would be the tool assisted provision of such 'hints' given stated goals.
It can be seen that simulated annealing here is Figure 12 . Simulated Annealing on Reduced Assumptions Problem (also 4 Goals) with Four Beliefs per Message far more robust to changes in the fitness function than genetic search (though destination judgement is clearly still very poor). Indeed, it would seem that simulated annealing markedly outperforms the genetic algorithm here unless very particular parametric choices are made.
Reduction of Assumptions
There are two rather strange assumptions in the precondition, namely
As we have seen, these were introduced to allow communication of freshness indicators between A and B via the server S, allowing a simple belief like A |≡ B |∼ N b to be derived for A and so B |∼ N b can be included in messages by A. The need for this arises due to the restriction on the messages that can be communicated in our present tools. If A were able to send a belief S |∼ B |∼ N b to B the assumptions would be unnecessary. It is still possible to remove these assumptions but an extra interaction between A and B is required (i.e. the final three interactions will be between A and B). Accordingly, the two assumptions were removed and the problem re-attempted.
Simulated Annealing Results
The results (for 20 runs, parameters as before) are given below in Figure 12 . Interestingly, although the problem is logically 'harder' the efficiency and success rates on some strategies is actually better. This may seem paradoxical but we note that missing out the jurisdiction assumptions may actually cause fewer beliefs to be deduced on receiving a message (and indeed those very assumptions are no longer available for inclusion in a message as beliefs themselves). Thus, this may reduce the number of feasible combinations of message contents. Again robustness and efficiency are key features.
Genetic Algorithms Results
The problem was attacked using the same mutation and crossover parameter values, the Uniform Credit strategy and with a population of gene strings representing seven message protocols. The results were disappointing and the technique failed to find a solution more often than not. Furthermore, examination of the evolution process and the best candidate protocols found during the searches showed that the search often got very close to solving the problem and often quite early in the search (e.g. less than thirty generations) but found great difficulty getting the final messages right. Typically the best solution found satisfied three goals but had a final message involving the server. In a sense, the technique was unable to 'hill-climb' its way to a solution.
A modification of the technique was attempted. The population size was increased to 400. In addition, after 60 generations the population was replaced entirely with copies of the best solution found so far. The bits of the strings corresponding to message (7) were randomised (i.e. the bits representing the sending and receiving principals and also the message contents). This reseeding of the population was repeated every subsequent 20 generations. The idea is that the population starts with identical messages 1 through 6 and randomisation is used to help move in the right direction. Of course, all parts of the strings may change by mutation subsequently (and so later by crossover too). Eighteen out of twenty searches found a solution. A typical solution found is given in Figure 13: All eighteen solutions found have essentially the same 'shape', though the particular nonces supplied may differ, for example 1.B → S : { (N b)} Kbs , or the protocols simply reversed the roles of A and B. None corresponded to having the above messages appear in the the order (1)(3)(2)(4) but this is not surprising since Uniform Credit does not favour this option. The above rectification seems, however, very ad hoc.
That the original approach should be unsuccessful is interesting. The search rapidly established the first two beliefs A |≡ A Kab ←→ B and B |≡ A Kab ←→ B after 4 messages but seemed to find difficulty in reliably establishing the two remaining beliefs. A third belief may be established after 6 or 7 messages. To satisfy a third belief seems to leave too much to chance. You need to get messages (5) and (6) Figure 13 .
Typical Seven-message Solution Found way to hill-climb to this situation.
Even when a third belief is achieved, the cumulative number of achieved goals during the protocols is given by (0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3) and (0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3) giving values of 6000 and 5500 under the Uniform Credit scheme. This is not that much in excess of the 5000 that would arise when only two goals are met (0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2) and so a protocol with the most helpful achivement profile of (0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3) may not even survive selection. With cumulative fitness functions later achievement seems inadequately rewarded. When a better candidate arises it must flourish under selection and survive the worst excesses of mutation and crossover. Also, protocols with an achievement profile of (0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3) tend to cause the search process to be deceived (they look appealing in terms of achievement but the technique has no way of knowing that it is heading for a cul-de-sac).
Reducing the Number of Beliefs per Component
The experiments described above allowed protocols to include 'junk' beliefs, beliefs that did not contribute to the logical attainment of the security goals in the final protocol. That is, it is possible simply to erase certain beliefs from the messages of the final protocol and still achieve the stated security goals. From the point of view of solution mechanism, however, all belief components are relevant since the indexing of beliefs in the receiver's state will be affected by the receipt of 'irrelevant' beliefs.
Use of the word 'irrelevant' here would seem rather narrow. In practice we cannot tell which beliefs are irrelevant until the end of the protocol. Thus, the irrelevance of beliefs in earlier messages may be determined by the content of subsequent messages. However, the more beliefs included in messages the richer the information receiving principals obtain. Thus, information rich messages actually create greater potential for achieving goals (giving the receiver more information cannot reduce the numbers of ways the goals may be met). However, this is viewing things from the abstract logic point of view. Large messages may carry a cost in terms of the solution mechanism. Goals are often satisfied by having appropriate components in various messages. Larger messages will lead to larger belief states and this may affect the ability of the search process to find appropriate combinations of beliefs to satisfy the goals.
We proceed in the spirit of the experiments above but simply reduce the number of beliefs components per message. We have repeated the above experiments allowing three beliefs per component and then only two beliefs per component. In the case of two beliefs per component it is necessary to extend the number of messages to eight (i.e. this is the least number of messages possible to satisfy the goals). We have carried out these additional experiments for annealing only. In [8] we showed how the reliability of the GAs could be increased by increasing the number of belief components per message. This is not without significant computational cost as well as necessitating a rather cumbersome post-processing to extract those fragments of the generated protocol relevant to attaining the specified security goals.
Reducing the Number of Beliefs per Component To Three
The results for three beliefs per message are given in Figure 14 . For the original problem, in all cases except destination judgement (DJ), both the success fraction and efficiency are decreased. For the reduced goals problem all fitness functions give rise to poorer results than for four component messages. Rather strangely, the harder reduced assumptions problem does not lead to a significant reduction in performance.
Reducing the Number of Beliefs per Component To Two
Here we allow at most two belief components per message. This gives rise to a highly constrained problem (with solutions largely being variations on the same theme). First note that to exchange messages A and B must first obtain the key Kab. This will require each of A and B to receive a message that Figure 15 . Protocol Generated During Experimentation Figure 16 . Protocol Generated During Experimentation contains the key Kab together with an appropriate freshness indicator (which it must have supplied to S in a previous message). Thus, the first four messages must be pairwise exchanges between A and S and also between B and S. The final four messages are communications between A and B in which each supplies a nonce to the other which is returned together with an assertion that the key Kab is good. A typical protocol is shown in Figure 15 .
There is another general way in which the goals can be satisfied. That is for a nonce indication to be passed between the two communcicants in a message from the server S. This is shown in the protocol in Figure 16 . Variations on this theme were very much in the minority amongst successful protocols evolved.
The results for three beliefs per message are given in Figure 14 .
The results seem markedly worse than for two component messages. They show that the relentless pursuit of 'efficiency' is not without its costs. Indeed, it would appear that embracing the greater logical potentials of component redundancy and postprocessing away irrelevant beliefs in the final protocol is far more efficient than constraining oneself to be more efficient from the start. In a sense, when redundancy is allowed the simulated annealing has features of a genetic algorithm, but without any problems with respect to hill-climbing.
Efficiency
We have not directly addressed the efficiency of the protocol itself in this paper, but it has not been ignored. Indeed, a bias towards short protocols has actually been built in to most of the weighting strategies of Figure 2 . The cumulative nature of the reward strategies (except Destination Judgment) means that shorter protocols will be favoured. For a protocol with 6 messages a goal achieved after one message will contribute
wi to the eventual fitness, a goal achieved with the last message contributes only w6. The earlier a goal is achieved the more reward it gets. As a consequence a shorter protocol that meets all the goals will generally be favoured over a longer one.
This notion of efficiency is rather crude. A more sophisticated approach would recognise that server interactions are to be reduced if possible (since the server may provide services to many thousands of principals), and that actually implementing the sending of different types of belief will incur different computation expense when implemented. However, a suitably parametrised fitness function would seem an ideal approach to handle these issues.
Conclusions and Further Work
Summary
The above work has indicated that the mechanisms of evolutionary search and simulated annealing may plausibly be used to generate abstract protocols from end-to-end specifications. Furthermore, the resulting protocols are provably correct visá vis the BAN logic -though additional security analysis would be essential, showing that a concrete refinement does not have type flaws, that a sender can recognise its own messages etc. The tools can be used to search the design space and provide input to human designers who would derive a concrete refinement of the chosen abstract protocol. An interesting by-product of our approach is that logging the application of the inference rules during execution provides a proof script of the protocols correctness.
The problem of logical correctness and efficiency are handled by the same solution mechanism (optimisation). This framework is at an early stage of development but has great potential to be further developed and extended to handle other criteria, as we argue below.
In terms of technique, the application to a series of related problems has shown that evolving protocols may well be a very subtle matter. The fitness function clearly plays an important role (as indeed it does in many optimisation problems). Genetic algorithms seemed particularly sensitive to parametric variation and fitness function choice. Annealing seemed more robust.
There is very little work in the field of automated secure protocol synthesis. As far as we are aware, only three papers have seen publication [9, 8, 10] Their strengths would seem complementary. The model checking approaches of Song et al. require significant computation time to carry out a search amongst all possibilities. It also incorporates a sophisticated intruder model. The quasi-enumerative nature of model checking also provides guarantees that certain solutions are optimimal (i.e. no shorter protocol exists satisfying the requirements). However, the potential for state space explosion is significant. Many of the protocols generated by the model checking search technique have been very small. With our approach we have demonstrated the ability to generate protocols with 8 messages (and in other experiments have in fact generated larger protocols). The meta-heuristic approach seems highly scalable. It exchanges guarantees of optimality for computational tractability (the typical story for meta-heuristics).
It could perhaps be used as a front end to generate candidates for further analysis.
Further Work
The optimisation framework offers the possibility of encompassing further criteria:
• efficiency: integrate efficiency considerations into the search process itself.
• avoidance of overloading: encourage reduced interactions with particular principals, most typically key servers.
• probabilistic belief inference: there is always some risk associated with statements about the real world and various probabilistic belief logics have been developed, e.g. [15] . The designer may wish to develop a protocol that maximises the probabilities of particular goals being satisfied.
Other pragmatic improvements are also envisaged:
• removing the restriction that only simple beliefs and single operator beliefs may be communicated in messages.
• adopting a much more flexible and advanced genetic algorithms framework -one that works with a natural encoding of the problem rather than a bit string representation. In addition, the use of a Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm (MOGA) framework would seem ideal for our purposes.
• further investigation as to how the choice of parameters (mutation rates, crossover probabilities, method of selection, fitness function etc.) affects the efficacy of the technique.
• testing the method over a wide range of protocol problems.
We believe that the development and availability of decision aids for handling design tradeoffs is a crucial issue for security and user communities. The topic is not an easy one and there seems to be great deal of research work to be done. We recommend the area to other researchers. We are also now working on the use of heuristic search techniques for network design with multiple criteria (including security and availability) and the use of heuristic search for the design of cryptographic building blocks and also for block cipher cryptanalysis.
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